Some observations on Dr. Bradley M. Gottfried’s article “To fail twice: Brockenbrough's Brigade at Gettysburg”

Dr. Bradley M. Gottfried’s article, which appeared in Issue 23 of Gettysburg Magazine, contains a number of pointed criticisms of the performance of Colonel John M. Brockenbrough and his men at the battle of Gettysburg. As the 55th Va. served in Brockenbrough’s Brigade and constituted nearly a third of its strength, this may be an appropriate place to offer a defense of their conduct.

The author estimates the strength of Brockenbrough's Brigade at Gettysburg at “about a thousand muskets” (i.e. around 1,100 officers and men). This is an overestimate, which has significant implications when it comes to calculating the frontage it covered and the percentage of casualties it suffered. The brigade's strongest regiment (the 55th Va.) numbered 280 officers and men the day before the battle. The 40th and 47th Va. may be estimated at around 250 officers and men each. The 22nd Va. Btn. had gone into action at Chancellorsville just a few weeks earlier with 102 officers and men and lost 45 killed and wounded. It is unlikely to have contained more than 100 soldiers on July 1st. The official report of the brigade's actions at Gettysburg submitted by Colonel R. M. Mayo of the 47th Va. on August 13th 1863 states the brigade commenced the battle with 800 muskets (i.e. around 880 officers and men) [1]. These figures are corroborative.

Dr. Gottfried refers to the brigade's “questionable behaviour” during the march north and bases this on letters written home by two soldiers, one from the 40th Va. and one from the 47th Va.. These letters need to be read with care. Both men are simply describing depredations committed by the Confederate Army. They are not admitting that their brigade was responsible for these depredations. The road Brockenbrough's Brigade was on had been used by 50,000 other Confederate troops in the previous ten days.

July 1st

The map published with the article shows Brockenbrough’s Brigade extending across half of the Herbst Woods as well as the field in front of the McPherson’s Farm. This seems unlikely. If its left was anchored on the Chambersburg Pike (and Allen Redwood, who was there, shows the left at the pike in his illustration of the attack), then the 880-man brigade would not have had sufficient manpower to extend as far as the wood [2]. According to the official report of the 26th N.C., that regiment covered the entire frontage of the wood [3]. As the 26th numbered 800 men, it was strong enough to have done so. (These conclusions are based on the standard deployment of four- to five-men per yard.) The map also shows the 26th N.C. as being the same size as the 22nd Va. Btn. This is unhelpful, as the 26th was eight times bigger than the 22nd.

While Major John Mansfield of the Iron Brigade describes the Confederate attack on his position in some detail, he does not identify the unit[s] making it [4]. Dr. Gottfried’s assumption that these troops were the 22nd Va. Btn. and the 40th Va. is his own. For the reasons given above, it seems more likely they were the left wing of the 26th N.C.

As McPherson’s Ridge blocks the line of sight between Willoughby Run and the terrain for which Daniel’s and Stone’s Brigades were contending, it was not possible for Daniel and Brockenbrough to co-ordinate their movements.

While it is conceivable that Brockenbrough could have broken through in the McPherson Farm area had he pushed rapidly ahead with his first attack, he had no way of knowing this. What he did know was that the 26th N.C. Regiment to his right was engaged in one of the bitterest struggles of the war. In clearing the Iron Brigade out of the Herbst Woods, that regiment lost over 400 of its 800 men, including fourteen colour bearers. The enemy rallied twice and fought to the last. The advance was slow. If Brockenbrough had rushed forward he would have exposed his right wing to enfilade from the Union troops in the woods. It was presumably to avoid this that he “moderated” the movements of his brigade. He was indeed “awaiting developments on other portions of the field…”.

The strength of the 150th Pa.’s position along McPherson’s Ridge has often been remarked upon. The Stone Barn was, and still is, a natural fortress. Brockenbrough’s attacks seems to have been quite determined, indeed surprisingly so considering the battering the 55th Va. and 22nd Va. Btn. had suffered at Chancellorsville just a few weeks earlier [5]. Given that the enemy were in a good defensive position and Brockenbrough’s men were out in the open, the number of dead Federals found in and around the farm pays tribute to the accuracy of the Virginians’ aim and their coolness under fire. Claims that their attacks lacked spirit seem ungenerous [6].

After Brockenbrough’s Brigade overran the McPherson’s Ridge, it advanced into the dip between that ridge and Seminary Ridge, cutting off a number of Federals who had remained in the Stone Barn. It was assumed these enemies would surrender, but they did not. Instead, they fired out of the loopholes of the barn into the backs of the advancing Virginians. Colonel Christian of the 55th Va. then sent Major Lawson back with two companies (about 50 men) to get the Yankees out of the building. Lawson met a Union officer in the doorway and ordered him to surrender. The Federal officer replied by firing a pistol into Lawson’s face. The bullet missed and hit another 55th officer standing a little behind Lawson. Sergeant Arthur Allen of Co.A, 55th Va. then killed the Union officer. After several “sharp passages” (presumably verbal) the Yankees in the barn surrendered. According to Colonel Christian, no fewer than 350 Federal soldiers were found in the building. For a brigade reduced to around 650 effectives to have continued in close pursuit of the enemy while so encumbered with prisoners would have been very difficult and it is unreasonable to expect it to have done so [7] [8]. There also seems little justification for the assumption that Brockenbrough then simply allowed his men to “loiter” and “lounge” around McPherson’s Ridge. While the Confederates were engaged in securing the Stone Barn, the Federals had been energetically preparing a new defense line along Seminary Ridge. From there they opened fire on McPherson’s Ridge with about twenty guns. It soon became a place where no sensible person would wish to “loiter” or “lounge”. Brockenbrough pulled his men back to the reverse slope of McPherson’s, put them in line and had them lie down. He could go no further. His men had suffered nearly 20% casualties, they had been in action for an hour and a half and exhausted their ammunition (each man would have gone into action with 40 rounds – a trained soldier could fire two rounds a minute) and the enemy were rapidly strengthening their position on Seminary Ridge for another stand. To have attacked again under such circumstances would have been foolhardy and Brockenbrough forbore from doing so. Scales’ Brigade then took over the advance. Despite the fact that it was fresh, three times stronger than Brockenbrough’s Brigade and attacked in conjunction with two other brigades, it was blown off its feet by the defensive fire from Seminary Ridge. Scales has recently been criticised by historians for attacking in the manner that he did [9].

Dr. Gottfried’s conclusion that Brockenbrough’s Brigade did not perform well on July 1st seems somewhat harsh. It is true other units on that part of the line achieved (or failed to achieve) their objectives with much higher butcher’s bills, but casualty lists do not tell us everything about a unit’s effectiveness.

July 3rd

In his note number 26, Dr. Gottfried states that Homer Musselman's and my reference to the delay in the advance of Davis’s Brigade “appears to be false”. The evidence for Davis’s failure to advance on time comes from an address delivered by Louis G. Young, who was an officer on the staff of General Pettigrew (Davis’s divisional commander). Young states:

It seems odd that Dr. Gottfried should quote from the third sentence of this statement to back up his contentions, while suggesting Musselman and I are mistaken when we quote from the first two.

Colonel Sawyer of the 8th Ohio says he dispersed the extreme left of the Confederate line (Brockenbrough) with rifle fire and then outflanked the next unit in line (Davis) which was the one receiving the concentrated artillery fire [11]. If this is true (and Sawyer was there) then Dr. Gottfried’s assumption that Brockenbrough’s Brigade was the unit on the receiving end of the destructive artillery and flanking fire is a mistake. The casualty figures for Davis’ and Brockenbrough’s Brigades – very heavy and very light respectively – suggest he is mistaken.

Colonel Mayo did not state “the brigade did not number more than two hundred”. On the contrary, his official report, dated August 13th, 1863 states the brigade went into action with 800 muskets on July 1st and 500 muskets on July 3rd (about 880 and 550 officers and men respectively) [1].

Sources.

1) Unpublished Report of the part taken by Heth’s (Old) Brigade [i.e. Brockenbrough’s Brigade] in the Battles of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Submitted by Col. R. M. Mayo of the 47th Va., dated August 13th 1863. In the possession of the Museum of the Confederacy.
2) Illustration by Allen Redwood entitled “Assault of Brockenbrough’s Confederate Brigade (Heth’s Division) upon the Stone Barn of the McPherson Farm”. B & L Vol. 3, page 278.
3) Report of the 26th N.C. Regiment, dated August 9th, 1863. O.R. Series 1, Vol 27, Part 2, page 643.
4) Report of Major John Mansfield, dated November 15th, 1863. O.R. Series 1, Vol. 27, Part 1, page 274.
5) Report of the 22nd Va. Btn. at Chancellorsville, dated May 13th, 1863. O.R. Series 1, Vol. 25, Part 1, page 901.
6) Reminiscences of a Rebel by Captain W. F. Dunaway. Neal Publishing Co. 1913. Page 86.
7) Gettysburg Magazine, Issue 16, Dr. Billy’s Battles, page 90.
8) Letter from W. S. Christian to J. W. Daniel, dated October 24th, 1903. Daniel Papers, document 158, Manuscript Division, Special Collections Department, U. Va. Library.
9) Gettysburg July 1st by David G. Martin, published by Casemate, October 1995.
10) Address of Louis G. Young delivered before the Confederate Veterans’ Association of Savannah, Ga. on April 3rd, 1900.
11) Report of Lt. Col. Sawyer of the 8th Ohio, dated July 5th, 1863. O.R. Series 1, Vol. 27, Part 1, pages 461 – 462.